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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 When blushing couples walk down the aisle, they hope to live 
happily ever after, promising “ ’til death do us part.” Even with such 
high hopes, many savvy couples sign prenuptial agreements in an-
ticipation of the possibility that the marriage might not turn out as 
they had planned. Indeed, many individuals will not enter into a 
marriage without having such an agreement in place. How many 
would enter into a marriage today if it were possible that their state 
might not permit them to divorce at all? 
 When a marriage isn’t going well, all states have a judicial 
mechanism whereby the unhappy couple can divorce without either 
spouse having to prove fault, and many states provide the option of 
proving fault as well.1 However, when the “marriage” is one of mem-
bers in a Limited Liability Company (LLC), the availability and 
mechanisms of dissolution vary from state to state. Some states have 
                                                                                                                     
 * B.A., San José State University, 1992; M.B.A., University of San Diego, 1999; 
J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2006. 
 1. See Peter Nash Swisher, Marriage and Some Troubling Issues with No-Fault Di-
vorce, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 243, 248 (2005). 
574  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:573 
 
default rules whereby one member can force a dissolution,2 while 
other states require the consent of at least a majority of members.3 In 
states requiring majority consent, a minority member may still be 
able to obtain judicial dissolution, but to do so, the minority member 
must not only state that the “marriage” is irretrievably broken but 
must also prove this assertion to the satisfaction of the court by 
meeting standards that range from relatively easy to nearly impossi-
ble to achieve.4 Furthermore, with the paucity of case law on the sub-
ject and the lack of judicial consistency as to which body of law the 
courts will apply, determining which standards the court will likely 
apply is a gamble at best–making it difficult for the member to pre-
pare its case appropriately. If the member is unsuccessful in predict-
ing the court’s standards and proving that its case has met them, the 
member will find itself stuck in the marriage indefinitely, with its 
capital tied up and no say as to the decisions that affect its invest-
ment. This has not always been the case. 
 Part II of this Comment addresses the history of LLC statutory 
dissolution provisions and how their devolution has brought about 
the gradual metamorphosis of the LLC from the ideal small business 
entity into a much less flexible estate planning vehicle. Part III ex-
amines the current state of dissolution statutes among the various 
states and the bodies of law and model acts upon which they are 
based. Part IV analyzes the interpretations of these statutes by vari-
ous courts and illustrates the unpredictability of outcomes through 
representative case examples. Part V discusses the role of the operat-
ing agreement in protecting unwary LLC members against hidden 
traps that lurk in estate-friendly LLC statutes. Part VI concludes 
that legislatures must carefully examine the policy reasons behind 
their entity statutes if they wish to salvage and preserve the LLC as 
a viable entity for small businesses. 
II.   HISTORY OF LLC STATUTORY DISSOLUTION PROVISIONS 
 The LLC was conceptually designed as an unincorporated busi-
                                                                                                                     
 2. See David M. Deaton, Check-the-Box: An Opportunity for States to Take Another 
Look at Business Formation, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1741, 1771 (1999). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See James R. Cambridge, The Judicial Dissolution of a Michigan Limited Liabil-
ity Company When Members Deadlock, MICH. BUS. L.J., Fall 2005, at 38, 38, available at 
http://www.krwplc.com/BusinessLawJournalFall2005.pdf. 
The court . . . may order the dissolution of an LLC only if the company is un-
able to carry on business in conformity with its articles of organization or oper-
ating agreement. This requires more than the members finding it difficult to 
carry on the business. It is a very high standard to meet, and it reflects the in-
tent of the Michigan LLCA that the judicial dissolution of an LLC when the 
members deadlock should be an extraordinary event. 
Id. 
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ness entity that would provide its owners, termed “members,” with 
three distinct benefits: corporate-like limited personal liability for 
the obligations of the firm, partnership-like avoidance of double taxa-
tion, and broad flexibility to contractually arrange the business as its 
members and/or managers see fit.5 An LLC may be structured in one 
of two ways: member-managed or manager-managed.6 In a member-
managed LLC, all of the members have apparent agency authority, 
comparable to that of partners in a partnership, to make managerial 
decisions on behalf of the LLC and to bind the LLC to the extent that 
the members are carrying on the usual and ordinary business of the 
LLC.7 In contrast, in a manager-managed LLC, it is the managers, 
who are not necessarily members, who have authority to bind the 
LLC and to make daily operating decisions.8 Those members who are 
not managers in a manager-managed LLC are not considered agents 
of the LLC, and their power to control the firm is generally limited to 
involvement only in major decisions, if any.9 It is the manager-
managed model that first gave rise to the tug of war between busi-
ness policy and tax policy with regard to influencing the statutes that 
govern judicial dissolution of LLCs.10 
A.   Early Dissolution Provisions 
 The popularity of the LLC first took off when the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) issued a revenue ruling in 1988 formally recogniz-
ing that a limited liability entity could be taxed as a partnership, 
thus avoiding the dreaded double taxation of a corporation.11 From 
that point forward, states moved quickly to adopt LLC statutes, and 
by mid-1996, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had LLC 
statutes.12 The dissolution provisions of these early LLC statutes 
were designed largely to aid the LLC in obtaining partnership classi-
fication for tax purposes under the IRS’s then-existing entity tax 
classification scheme.13 Under the now-defunct IRS Regulation 
301.7701-2(a)(3),14 which codified the decision in United States v. 
                                                                                                                     
 5. For a history of the evolution of the LLC, see generally LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT 
R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (2d ed. 2004). 
 6. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 500 (8th ed. 2000). 
 7. See id.  
 8. See Larry E. Ribstein, The New Choice of Entity for Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 325, 337 (1997). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See discussion infra Part II.A.  
 11. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361. 
 12. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 328. 
 13. See Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution 
Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?, 
38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 426-27 (2001). 
 14. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960). 
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Kintner,15 an LLC would be taxed as a corporation if it possessed 
more corporate than noncorporate characteristics as determined by 
the four-factor Kintner test: continuity of life, centralization of man-
agement, limited liability and free transferability of interest.16 Par-
ticularly in manager-managed LLCs, where it was quite likely that 
centralized management would be found in addition to limited liabil-
ity, it was often critical for the LLC to avoid the corporate character-
istic of continuity of life. The United States Treasury specifically rec-
ognized continuity of life as being present if the death, insanity, 
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member 
would not trigger dissolution of the firm.17 
 In an effort to help LLCs avoid the continuity of life characteristic, 
the majority of early state LLC statutes closely tracked the language 
of the IRS regulations in defining continuity of life.18 As an additional 
precaution, most LLC statutes provided that while LLC members 
had the power to withdraw from an LLC, similar to partners in part-
nerships, such withdrawal would trigger the dissolution of the LLC, 
absent a contrary provision in the LLC’s operating agreement.19 
Upon withdrawal, a withdrawing member would receive the fair 
value of its ownership interest, less any damages for wrongful con-
duct, and the LLC would be dissolved.20 
 While the characteristic of noncontinuity of life was useful, and 
indeed often necessary, in achieving partnership tax classification, 
this characteristic was understandably unattractive to investors, 
third-party lenders, and contract partners because of the uncertainty 
associated with potential dissolution.21 Growing dissatisfied with the 
rigid requirements for partnership tax classification, business law 
practitioners increasingly flooded the IRS with private letter ruling 
requests that sought to narrow the circumstances under which disso-
lution would occur.22 Eventually, in 1997, the IRS abandoned the  
Kintner test and enacted the current “check-the-box” regulations that 
now classify all new LLCs as partnerships for tax purposes, regard-
less of continuity of life and other “corporate” characteristics, unless 
                                                                                                                     
 15. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1993). 
 18. See Miller, supra note 13, at 428. 
 19. See 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 5, § 11-2 (2d ed. 2004). 
 20. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & The Limited Liability Company: Learn-
ing (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 926-27 (2005). 
 21. See Peter A. Mahler, When Limited Liability Companies Seek Judicial Dissolu-
tion, Will the Statute Be Up to the Task?, 74-Jun N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 11 (2002). 
 22. See Miller, supra note 13, at 428-29. 
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they specifically elect to be classified as corporations.23 
B.   The Effect of "Check-the-Box" on Dissolution Provisions 
 With the advent of “check-the-box” and the elimination of the tax-
driven need to avoid corporate characteristics, state legislatures were 
then free to rewrite statutory provisions governing dissolution of 
LLCs to be more investor-friendly and to promote sound business 
policies. With no valid business reason remaining to allow an indi-
vidual member to cause the dissolution of an LLC at will, and an 
abundance of strong business policy reasons to disallow it,24 many 
state legislatures responded by eliminating provisions requiring 
“contingent dissolution,” or dissolution that is automatically trig-
gered by withdrawal or other separation of a member.25 
 The question remained, however, whether to permit members to 
dissociate from an LLC. “Dissociation” is a term of art borrowed from 
partnership law and refers to a termination of some or all of the rela-
tional ties between the member and the LLC.26 Unlike earlier forms 
of withdrawal, however, dissociation does not necessarily lead to dis-
solution.27 Initial statutory default provisions allowed members to 
dissociate from the LLC and receive the fair market value of their in-
vestment interest, less any damages attributed to the member’s dis-
sociation.28 A number of state legislatures, however, have redrafted 
their dissolution and dissociation provisions to eliminate or severely re-
strict members’ rights to dissociate and liquidate their investments.29 
 The combined effect of eliminating both dissolution and dissocia-
tion rights creates a trap for unwary minority members. Members of 
an LLC whose operating agreement lacks a provision expressly 
granting dissociation and buyout rights, either because such a provi-
sion is statutorily forbidden or nullified or because a buyout provi-
sion was simply overlooked by the drafters of the operating agree-
ment, are effectively “locked in” with no way to liquidate their in-
                                                                                                                     
 23. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3 (1996); 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT 
B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND 
LLC MEMBERS § 6:2, at 6-3 (rev. 2d ed. 2004). 
 24. See Miller, supra note 13, at 423 (Referring to partnerships, Professor Miller’s ob-
servations would also apply to LLCs and highlight yet another business policy reason to 
disallow contingent dissolution provisions: “The threat of a dissolution can be a powerful 
weapon in the hands of dissatisfied participants in a partnership and creates the potential 
for wealthy partners to squeeze-out their less well-to-do partners by entering unfairly low 
bids for the business.”). 
 25. See id. at 429-30. 
 26. See Susan Kalinka, Dissociation of a Member from a Louisiana Limited Liability 
Company: The Need for Reform, 66 LA. L. REV. 365, 365 (2006). 
 27. See Laurel Wheeling Farrar & Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation from Alabama Lim-
ited Liability Companies in the Post Check-the-Box Era, 49 ALA. L. REV. 909, 919 (1998). 
 28. See Miller, supra note 13, at 430. 
 29. See Moll, supra note 20, at 932-33. 
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vestment interest until such time as the LLC is dissolved.30 If the oper-
ating agreement does not define a specific term for the life of the LLC, 
minority members could find their investments locked up indefinitely. 
C.   States Tailor Dissolution Provisions to Achieve “Marketability 
Discounts” 
 While elimination of both dissolution and dissociation rights may 
have some business policy merit in that it arguably creates a more 
stable business environment, the movement to eliminate both disso-
lution and dissociation rights appears to be driven not by sound 
business policy but once again by tax motives.31 Recall that the previ-
ous tax policy influence on LLC dissolution provisions was beneficial to 
small business owners, helping them to achieve pass-through partner-
ship tax classification. The current tax policy influence is not focused on 
benefiting the small business, but rather is driven by estate planners 
seizing the family-owned LLC as a vehicle of opportunity to transfer 
wealth between family generations with minimal tax consequences.32 
 The process works as follows: Investors who own an interest in a 
closely held entity, such as an LLC, can often claim a “marketability 
discount” for tax purposes. A marketability discount is a reduced 
valuation of the investor’s interest based on the difficulty of liquidat-
ing interest in a firm that is not publicly traded.33 For members of 
family-owned LLCs to take advantage of a marketability discount, 
both the LLC’s operating agreement and the state statute must com-
ply with specific federal tax requirements. Not only must the LLC’s 
operating agreement restrict members of the family-owned LLC from 
cashing out of the business through dissociation or dissolution, but 
state law itself must restrict such cash-outs.34 If the state law is less 
restrictive than the restrictions in the LLC’s operating agreement, 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See Miller, supra note 13, at 431. 
 31. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 27, at 936-37 (“[S]tate legislatures that have re-
vised or are revising their LLC statutes to eliminate the dissolution and dissociation provi-
sions once again experience the tax rules dictating substantive business provisions that 
should be drafted to further larger business policy concerns.”); Miller, supra note 13, at 415 
(“The driving force behind the reforms is to facilitate estate and gift tax valuation dis-
counts for minority interests in family-owned limited liability companies.”); Moll, supra 
note 20, at 936: 
 Although one could attempt to justify the curbing of withdrawal and dissolu-
tion rights on the ground that “locking-in” capital helps to facilitate business 
development, the movement to restrict exit rights appears to be motivated pri-
marily by a desire to make the family-owned LLC an attractive business struc-
ture for estate and gift tax purposes. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 32. See Joseph M. Mona, Advantages of Using a Limited Liability Company in an Es-
tate Plan, 25 EST. PLAN. 167, 167-71 (May 1998). 
 33. See SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND 
APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 333 (3d ed. 1996). 
 34. See Moll, supra note 20, at 937 n.179.  
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the LLC’s restrictions will be ignored for the purpose of determining 
a marketability discount.35 As a result, many states have amended 
their statutes to facilitate estate planning by further restricting LLC 
members’ ability to liquidate their investment interests.36 
D.   The Cost to Small Business Owners 
 While these statutory amendments may accomplish the desired 
estate tax planning goals, the benefits that inure to the few may 
come at the expense of the many.37 By eliminating dissociation and 
dissolution rights of LLC members, states have left minority mem-
bers vulnerable to majority oppression, since minority members have 
virtually no way to exit the LLC and liquidate their investments.38 
Minority members without exit rights often find themselves subject 
to majority oppression tactics, such as withholding of dividends, em-
ployment restrictions, excessive compensation to majority members, 
withholding of information, violations of firm governance restric-
tions, and deprivation of a voice in firm decisionmaking.39 
 In theory, minority shareholders should be able to address the 
consequences of such tactics contractually ex ante. This theory, how-
ever, assumes a level contractual playing field, and there are many 
situations, particularly with LLCs, where this is unlikely to be the 
case. The LLC is often the choice of entity for small businesses, many 
of which are owned by families and close friends.40 In these situa-
                                                                                                                     
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 939 n.181. 
 37. See Howard M. Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution–The Social Cost of Aca-
demic Neglect, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 88-89 (2004): 
 The focus on estate tax planning as the driving force in shaping of dissolution 
provisions in LLCs has led legislatures to ignore many of the non-tax implica-
tions of corporate-like default rules for dissolution. . . . [L]egislators [should] fo-
cus on the business needs of the more typical small business in the state’s LLC 
statute. 
   . . . . 
   . . . Because the elimination of dissolution at will provisions were 
driven by estate and gift tax concerns, the larger issues relating to the business 
relationships of the parties in the typical LLC never surfaced. 
 
Id.; Moll, supra note 20, at 887 (“Unfortunately, this effort to meet the tax goals of some 
will come at a high price for many, as the LLC structure is now poised to repeat the op-
pression experience of the close corporation.”). 
 38. See 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 23, § 6:4, at 6-8; see also Miller, supra note 
13, at 433 (“The elimination of default exit rights could create a trap for the unwary minor-
ity LLC owner without adequate protection under an LLC agreement.”); Moll, supra note 
20, at 939-40 (“While perhaps accomplishing an estate tax goal, the elimination of default 
withdrawal and dissolution rights leaves minority members vulnerable to oppressive ma-
jority actions since the minority can no longer easily exit the venture with the value of its 
investment.”). 
 39. See Miller, supra note 13, at 436 (citing Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 
1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984)). 
 40. See Moll, supra note 20, at 952.  
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tions, it may not occur to the members that a dispute could arise, the 
members may simply not want to acknowledge this possibility, or one 
or more members may persuade another to forego addressing these 
issues contractually for any number of reasons. In addition, over 
generations, children may join the business, some members may pass 
away, and new members may inherit an interest. It is unlikely that 
negotiations under any of these conditions will be at arm’s length. 
 Furthermore, even if such negotiations do take place, members 
may not have the resources or foresight to retain competent counsel 
and will likely lack the sophistication to negotiate and draft an oper-
ating agreement that sufficiently addresses the consequences of op-
pression, other possible disputes, or deadlock among the members. 
Even if a comprehensive and effective agreement is satisfactorily 
reached, enforcement at the time a dispute arises will likely require 
the intervention of a neutral third party, which in many cases will be 
the court. In these cases, interpretation of any unclear provision of 
the operating agreement will be at least informed by, if not influ-
enced or trumped by, the state statutory default provisions. 
III.   CURRENT LLC STATUTES 
 Two organizations of legal scholars have put forth separate efforts 
to develop a standard model limited liability company act. The 
American Bar Association (ABA) has drafted the Prototype Limited 
Liability Company Act (PLLCA),41 while the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has developed the 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA).42 The PLLCA was 
drafted in 1992 by a working group within a subcommittee of the 
ABA and has never been approved by the ABA or any of its commit-
tees.43 The ULLCA was adopted by the NCCUSL in 1994, with 
amendments adopted in 1995 and 1996.44 While these model acts 
were actively undergoing development, the judicial dissolution provi-
sions of one or the other or both found their way in some form into 
most state LLC statutes.45 Because of the vast differences in both the 
language and the purpose of the two acts’ judicial dissolution provi-
sions, the result of these efforts to develop a standard has instead 
created widespread chaos. 
                                                                                                                     
 41. PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 902 (1992). 
 42. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(4)(v) (1996). 
 43. The PLLCA was drafted by the Working Group on the Prototype Limited Liability 
Company Act of the Subcommittee on Limited Liability Companies of the Committee on 
Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations of the American Bar Associa-
tion’s Section of Business Law. 
 44. See Kalinka, supra note 26, at 370 & n.22. 
 45. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B. 
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A.   Partnership Law-Based Dissolution Provisions and the PLLCA 
 The judicial dissolution provisions of many LLC statutes follow 
the language of the PLLCA, which permits judicial dissolution only 
when it is “not reasonably practicable to carry on the business . . . in 
conformity with the operating agreement.”46 This language is bor-
rowed from the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA), 
which permits judicial dissolution of a limited partnership whenever 
“it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the activities of the 
limited partnership in conformity with the partnership agree-
ment.”47 The RULPA language is itself borrowed from the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), which permits judicial dissolu-
tion, among other reasons, whenever “it is not otherwise reasona-
bly practicable to carry on the partnership business in conformity 
with the partnership agreement.”48 
 The vagueness of this language has left it to the courts to deter-
mine what is “reasonably practicable” in LLC dissolution litigation. 
Even the ABA’s own commentary to this section of the PLLCA im-
plicitly admits the vagueness of the language, stating that the “ ‘not 
reasonably practicable’ language probably includes at least some of 
the causes of dissolution provided for in partnership law.”49 This 
statement necessarily implies that at least some of the causes of dis-
solution provided for in partnership law may not be included in LLC 
law. The dissolution provisions of LLC law are therefore implicitly 
more restrictive than the related provisions in partnership law. The 
extent of these restrictions remains undefined by LLC statutes; thus 
the statutes provide little guidance to the judiciary as to how to in-
terpret this “reasonably practicable” language. 
B.   Close Corporation Law-Based Dissolution Provisions and the 
ULLCA 
 With LLC statutes now locking in members’ capital, LLCs are tak-
ing on some of the characteristics of the close corporation,50 and with 
them, some of the close corporation’s problems.51 In an attempt to 
address these problems, a number of states have adopted language 
from the ULLCA, which seems to be largely influenced by close cor-
                                                                                                                     
 46. PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 902 (1992). 
 47. REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 802 (2001). 
 48. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(5)(iii) (1997). 
 49. PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 902 (1992) cmt. 
 50. See 2 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 23, § 6:3, at 6-4 (“[The manager-managed 
LLC] look[s] more like a corporation with its entity power centralized in managers who re-
semble a board of directors.”). 
 51. See Moll, supra note 20, at 896 (“[T]he problem of oppression is ‘portable’ to the 
LLC context, as the LLC shares certain core features of the close corporation.”). For a dis-
cussion of oppression in the close corporation, see id. at 888-92. 
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poration oppression doctrine.52 
 Professor Moll of the University of Houston Law Center identifies 
four “seeds” of oppression that are common to both close corporations 
and LLCs: the lack of exit rights, the norm of majority rule, judicial 
deference to the business judgment rule, and the absence of advance 
planning.53 He suggests that in light of the similar opportunities for 
oppression, courts should extend the oppression doctrine that they 
have developed for close corporations to LLCs in order to safeguard 
minority LLC members in the same way that they protect minority 
shareholders in close corporations.54 
 The ULLCA attempts to address these issues in its judicial disso-
lution provisions. In contrast to the PLLCA’s “not reasonably practi-
cable” standard, the ULLCA permits judicial dissolution whenever 
“the managers or members in control of the company have acted, are 
acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, 
or unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner.”55 Several states have 
adopted the ULLCA’s judicial dissolution provisions, and many also 
provide for judicial dissolution whenever management is dead-
locked.56 California’s statute goes even further to safeguard minority 
members from oppression, permitting judicial dissolution whenever 
it is “reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests 
of the complaining members,” or when controlling members "know-
ingly countenance[] persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, 
or abuse of authority.”57 
 The ULLCA and other oppression doctrine-based judicial dissolu-
tion standards are not without their critics. One report suggests that 
the ULLCA provisions create the reverse problem of “too many op-
portunities for oppression of the majority by the minority.”58 In addi-
tion, the commentary accompanying the rival PLLCA cautions that 
allowing judicial dissolution for the often “indefinite concepts” found 
in many corporate judicial dissolution provisions would encourage 
opportunistic behavior by disgruntled members and creditors in 
cases of LLC dissolution.59 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See id. 
 53. See Moll, supra note 20, at 895-917. 
 54. See id. at 976. 
 55. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(4)(v) (1996). 
 56. For a sampling of states that have adopted this language into their statutes, see 
Miller, supra note 13, at 460-61. 
 57. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(a)(2), -(5). 
 58. Robert R. Keatinge & James W. Reynolds, Advisors’ Report on the Uniform Lim-
ited Liability Company Act § 4, submitted Mar. 13, 1995, to the Committee on Partner-
ships and Unincorporated Business Organizations of the Business Law Section of the 
American Bar Association. 
 59. See PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 902 (1992), cmt. 
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IV.   JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF DISSOLUTION PROVISIONS 
 Even within states, the judicial dissolution provisions of the same 
LLC statutes have been interpreted differently. Examples of recent 
cases from Delaware and New York illustrate how the application of 
different bodies of law can affect judicial dissolution cases and can 
sometimes lead to dramatically different outcomes. 
A.   Judicial Dissolutions in Delaware 
 Perhaps the most salient illustration of one state applying differ-
ent bodies of law to the judicial dissolution of LLCs comprises two re-
cent cases in Delaware. Though heard less than a year apart, these 
two cases, which both concerned LLCs whose members were deadlocked 
in a 50/50 split, were interpreted by the Delaware chancery court using 
corporate law in one case and partnership law in the other. 
1.   Haley v. Talcott: Delaware Applies Corporate Law 
 In 2004, the Delaware Court of Chancery heard the case of Haley 
v. Talcott.60 The LLC’s two members, Haley and Talcott, each owned 
a 50% interest in an LLC that owned a parcel of land.61 The LLC 
leased its land at a discount to a restaurant, which was wholly owned 
by Talcott but, prior to the dispute, operated by Haley.62 The underly-
ing land was mortgaged to the LLC, and Haley and Talcott had both 
signed personal guarantees on the loan.63 Haley and Talcott had a 
falling out and both members desired to go their separate ways but 
disagreed as to the method for doing so.64 Haley wished to dissolve 
the LLC, but Talcott contended that Haley could simply exercise 
an exit mechanism in the LLC's operating agreement whereby Ha-
ley could dissociate from the LLC and receive fair market value 
for his interest.65 
 The court found that the exit mechanism in the agreement was 
not a reasonable alternative because, due to Haley’s personal guar-
antee on the mortgage, Haley would remain liable for the debt of an 
entity over which he no longer had any control.66 The court thus de-
termined that Haley’s only practical remedy to break the deadlock 
was to seek judicial dissolution of the LLC.67 
 Lamenting the scarcity of case law interpreting judicial dissolu-
                                                                                                                     
 60. 864 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 61. Id. at 87-88. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 88. 
 64. Id. at 87. 
 65. Id. at 88. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 88-89. 
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tion of LLCs, the Delaware Court of Chancery looked to corporate 
law to determine the standards of judicial dissolution.68 In choosing 
corporate law, the court reasoned that “[w]hen a limited liability 
agreement provides for the company to be governed by its members, 
when there are only two members, and when those members are at 
permanent odds, [the law of joint venture corporations with only two 
stockholders] provides relevant insight into what should happen.”69  
 Applying the law of close corporations, the court held that Haley 
had met the standards for judicial dissolution by demonstrating that 
there was an indisputable deadlock between two 50% members and 
that the deadlock precluded the LLC from functioning as provided for 
in the LLC agreement.70 The court thus applied corporate-flavored 
analysis to arrive at its holding that it was “not reasonably practica-
ble for the LLC to continue to carry on business in conformity with 
the LLC Agreement”–clearly partnership-flavored statutory lan-
guage–and ordered the LLC dissolved.71 
2.   In re Silver Leaf, L.L.C.: Delaware Applies Partnership Law 
 In 2005, less than one year later, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
again heard a case in which the membership of an LLC was dead-
locked in a 50/50 split. In In re Silver Leaf, L.L.C.,72 three members 
formed an LLC to carry on a french fry vending machine scheme.73 
One member held a 50% interest, one member held a 30% interest, 
and one member held a 20% interest.74 The 50% member was at odds 
with the other two.75 
 In determining which body of case law to apply, the court again 
bemoaned the lack of case law addressing the dissolution of LLCs.76 
Oddly, although Haley v. Talcott has garnered significant media and 
scholarly attention,77 the court, in its thirst for case law, only men-
tioned Haley in a footnote, dismissing its usefulness primarily be-
                                                                                                                     
 68. Id. at 93-94. 
 69. Id. at 94. For a full analysis of the Court of Chancery’s application of joint venture 
corporate law to this case, see id. at 93-96. 
 70. Id. at 89. 
 71. Id. at 98. 
 72. No. Civ. A. 20611, 2005 WL 2045641 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2005). 
 73. Id. at *1. For an amusing diversion, read the story of this case as colorfully illus-
trated in Vice Chancellor Lamb’s opinion. The facts are hilarious, and the telling of them 
even better! 
 74. Id. at *3. 
 75. Id. at *10. 
 76. Id.  
 77. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 681 (6th ed. 2006); Cam-
bridge, supra note 4, at 41; John Goodgame, When Getting Out Is Hard to Do: Lessons in 
Splitting Up LLCs, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2005, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2005-05-06/goodgame.shtml. 
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cause Silver Leaf involved three members instead of two.78 
 Turning away from corporate law altogether, the court instead 
looked to limited partnership law to interpret the LLC statute, not-
ing that the dissolution statute for limited partnerships was essen-
tially the same as that for LLCs.79 Relying this time on Delaware lim-
ited partnership case law, the court set the “threshold” standard at 
whether the LLC could, “pursuant to its Operating Agreement, take 
the actions necessary to continue functioning as a business.”80 After 
determining that the members were deadlocked, that the operating 
agreement provided no mechanism for breaking a deadlock, and that 
the business purpose of the LLC was moot, the court, under this 
standard, dissolved the LLC.81 
 While the application of two different bodies of law to interpret 
the judicial dissolution provisions of Delaware’s LLC statute resulted 
in similar outcomes, this may well be largely attributable to the type 
of corporate law the court applied in Haley v. Talcott. The Delaware 
Court of Chancery applied a very narrow corporate statute that is 
limited specifically to two-person joint ventures.82 If the court had 
applied ordinary close corporation law or broader corporate law, the 
outcome might have been very different. 
B.   Judicial Dissolutions in New York 
 In 1994, Governor Mario Cuomo signed New York’s Limited Li-
ability Company Law (LLCL), which authorizes judicial dissolution 
“whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in 
conformity with the articles of organization or operating agree-
ment.”83 Nevertheless, the ensuing years have seen judicial confusion 
about which body of law to apply to New York LLC dissolution cases. 
1.   In re Roller: New York Looks to Corporate Law 
 In 1999, five years after the LLCL was enacted, the petitioners in 
In re Roller84 filed a case for judicial dissolution of two LLCs, alleging 
that it was “no longer reasonably practicable to carry on the business 
of the companies in conformity with the operating agreement of 
each.”85 The court, in its brief analysis, did not look to the operating 
agreements to determine if the business could be practicably carried 
                                                                                                                     
 78. Silver Leaf, 2005 WL 2045641, at *10 n.82. 
 79. Id. at 10. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 11. 
 82. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (2004). 
 83. Mahler, supra note 21, at 9-10. 
 84. 689 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. A.D. 4 Dept. 1999). 
 85. Mahler, supra note 21, at 13 and nn.27 & 29 (citing In re Roller, 689 N.Y.S.2d 
897). 
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on in conformity therewith.86 Instead, the court considered the follow-
ing four factors: the respondent had excluded the petitioners from 
the LLC’s business affairs, there was internal dissension and conflict, 
the respondent had denied the petitioners access to records and had 
managed the business to his sole benefit, and the dissolution would 
not harm the public.87 These are the “classic grounds for dissolution 
. . . for deadlock and oppression” under New York corporate law.88 
 While the court did not rule on the case, it did state that “ ‘the pe-
tition adequately state[d] a cause of action for judicial dissolution’ ” 
under New York LLC law.89 Although the petition did indeed state an 
adequate cause of action in accordance with the statute, the court’s 
four-factor analysis suggests that the court would apply the corpo-
rate oppression doctrine to LLC judicial dissolution cases. 
2.   In re Quinn: New York Looks to the Operating Agreement 
 Just thirteen months after In re Roller, another New York court 
looked to the operating agreement to determine whether an LLC 
could be dissolved. While not applying the dissolution statute di-
rectly, this case was a prelude to the closer adherence by the courts 
to New York’s LLC statute. 
 In the unreported decision of In re Quinn,90 the petitioner was the 
managing member with a minority ownership in a two-member 
LLC.91 When the respondent refused to increase the petitioner’s com-
pensation, the petitioner left the LLC.92 In denying the petitioner’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction forcing dissolution, the court fo-
cused on whether the respondent’s refusal to increase the petitioner’s 
compensation conformed to the operating agreement.93 While not di-
rectly addressing whether it would be reasonably practicable to carry 
on the business in conformity with the operating agreement, the 
court did at least look to the operating agreement in its analysis and 
determined that a compensation decision by a majority member was 
not an abuse of discretion when the operating agreement granted the 
majority member a controlling voting interest.94 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Mahler, supra note 21, at 13.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (quoting In re Roller, 689 N.Y.S.2d 897 at 898). 
 90. N.Y.L.J., Apr. 20, 2000, p. 32, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.). 
 91. Mahler, supra note 21, at 14 (citing In re Quinn, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 20, 2000, at 32, col. 6). 
 92. Id. at 14-15. 
 93. See id. at 15. 
 94. See id. 
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3.   Schindler v. Niche Media Holdings, LLC: New York Applies 
LLC Law 
 In 2003, New York again had the opportunity to interpret LLC 
dissolution provisions. In Schindler v. Niche Media Holdings,95 
Schindler was a 33.3% owner and Chairman of the Board of Niche 
Media Holdings, LLC.96 Niche Media was itself the sole member of 
Hamptons Media, LLC, a successful magazine publishing enter-
prise.97 Schindler alleged that another member, Binn, who was Chief 
Executive Officer with 35.7% ownership, had oppressed him by in-
creasing his own commissions without increasing Schindler’s propor-
tionally, withholding commissions from Schindler, canceling 
Schindler’s corporate credit card, and withholding Schindler’s prom-
ised weekly advance against business expenses that Schindler 
charged to his personal credit card.98 Schindler also accused Binn of 
misappropriating company assets and demanded an accounting of 
the use of company funds.99 Among other remedies, Schindler sought 
dissolution of both LLCs on grounds that “[l]iquidation of the Com-
pany Defendants is the only feasible means whereby the Companies’ 
members other than Binn may reasonably expect to obtain a fair re-
turn on their investment.”100 
 Rather than applying corporate oppression doctrine, as it did to 
find a cause of action in In re Roller, the court dismissed Schindler’s 
cause of action as unauthorized by New York’s LLC statute.101 The 
court reasoned that Schindler did not allege that it was no longer 
“reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with 
the articles of organization or operating agreement” as required by 
the language of New York’s LLC statute102 and that Schindler had in 
fact conceded that the business was thriving.103 
 Citing Schindler, subsequent cases in New York have dismissed 
causes of action when the petitioners did not allege or otherwise meet 
the statutory standard for judicial dissolution of LLCs.104 
                                                                                                                     
 95. 772 N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
 96. Id. at 783. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 783-84. 
 99. Id. at 784. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 784-85. 
 102. Id. at 785. 
 103. Id. at 785-86. 
 104. See Artigas v. Renewal Arts Realty Corp., 803 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 (N.Y. A.D. 1 Dept. 
2005) (holding that the petition for dissolution was properly dismissed because the “entity 
is a limited liability company, not a corporation; hence, it is governed by the Limited Li-
ability Company Law, not the Business Corporation Law, [and] [t]he petition did not plead 
the requisite grounds for dissolution of a limited liability company.” (citations omitted)); 
Horning v. Horning Constr., 816 N.Y.S.2d 877, 883 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (holding that the 
petitioner failed to meet his burden to raise a material issue of fact under the statutory 
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V.   THE ROLE OF THE OPERATING AGREEMENT 
 With the chaotic state of judicial dissolution provisions and the 
commensurate uncertainty as to how they will be interpreted, both 
from state to state and within the same state, a carefully drafted 
LLC operating agreement appears at present to be an LLC member’s 
best protection. 
 Recall that in Haley, the principal reason that Talcott did not win 
his argument to keep the LLC intact was that the exit mechanism in 
the operating agreement that Talcott argued Haley could use was 
“not a reasonable alternative.”105 Recall also that in Silver Leaf, one 
of the reasons the court gave for dissolving the LLC was that the 
members were deadlocked and the operating agreement provided no 
way around the deadlock.106 In analyzing the outcome of Haley, one 
ABA journal article identifies two “lessons” that LLCs can learn.107 
The first is to draft exit provisions into the operating agreement that 
require “complete separation of the departing member’s interest from 
the LLC.”108 The second is to “provide for resolution of a management 
deadlock” in the operating agreement.109 
 The need for a well-drafted operating agreement in the event of 
judicial dissolution litigation extends beyond the operating agree-
ment’s dissolution provision itself. Courts will look to the entire op-
erating agreement to determine whether it is practicable to carry on 
the business of the LLC in conformance therewith. For example, in 
the Louisiana case of Weinmann v. Duhon,110 members of an automo-
bile dealership that was organized as an LLC disagreed over the con-
tinued employment of the LLC’s general manager.111 The court de-
termined that the operating agreement itself created an impasse in 
the LLC since, under the agreement, one group of members could fire 
the general manager while the other group could simply rehire 
him.112 The court thus concluded that since it was no longer reasona-
bly practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the oper-
                                                                                                                     
standard for involuntary dissolution of an LLC where the evidence failed to show that it 
was not reasonably practicable to carry on the business). 
 105. Haley v. Talcott, 864 A.2d 86, 88 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 106. See In re Silver Leaf, L.L.C., No. Civ. A. 20611, 2005 WL 2045641, at *11 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 18, 2005). 
 107. See Goodgame, supra note 77 (“[C]ounsel should learn the lessons of Haley v. Tal-
cott and be careful to draft [operating] agreements so that parties intending to avoid judi-
cial dissolution will be able to structure economically acceptable exit provisions in the LLC 
agreement on which they can rely.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 818 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 111. See id. at 207-09. 
 112. See id. at 210. 
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ating agreement, dissolution of the LLC was the proper remedy.113 
 When drafting an operating agreement, it is critically important 
to review all provisions of the governing state’s LLC statutes and 
draft a comprehensive agreement. For any issue that is addressed by 
statute but not addressed in the operating agreement, the statutory 
provisions could be annexed by the courts into the operating agree-
ment as default “gap-fillers.” Furthermore, courts may construe 
other firm documents as “operating agreements” or gap-fillers in the 
absence of a written operating agreement. In the New York case of 
Spires v. Casterline,114 members of an LLC did not have a written op-
erating agreement.115 The court held that the firm’s Interim Voting 
Agreement contained sufficient provisions to qualify as an “operating 
agreement” under the statute.116 The court further held that in the 
absence of an operating agreement or when an operating agreement 
does not address the subject in question, the firm is bound by the 
provisions of the state statute.117 Thus, the Interim Voting Agree-
ment and the statutory default provisions became the operating 
agreement for purposes of the court’s analysis in this case, in which 
it ultimately dissolved the LLC.118 
 The very factors that make the LLC most attractive to small busi-
ness entrepreneurs–simplicity of organization and flexibility of con-
tract–likely also create an environment that is ripe for problematic 
operating agreements. Because many small businesses are composed 
of family members and close friends, agreements may not always be 
negotiated at arm’s length.119 In addition, because of the few required 
formalities, many LLCs may have unsophisticated or boilerplate op-
erating agreements, or may not have any operating agreement at 
all.120 Thus the very nature of the LLC may preclude it from protect-
ing itself against the events of a bad break-up. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The freedom and flexibility to contractually organize the LLC 
grants members an opportunity to fashion a kind of prenuptial 
agreement to plan for the challenges of a potential business di-
                                                                                                                     
 113. See id. 
 114. 778 N.Y.S.2d 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
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 116. Id. at 265. 
 117. Id. at 265-66. 
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vorce.121 That same freedom and flexibility, however, may lull mem-
bers into drafting incomplete or unsophisticated operating agree-
ments that, consequentially, will be of little use–or worse–in the 
event of dissolution litigation. In the absence of an adequate operat-
ing agreement or in the likely event that even sophisticated drafters 
will not have considered every eventuality, courts will look to the de-
fault judicial dissolution provisions in the states’ LLC statutes to fill 
in the gaps. To the extent that such statutes and the case law inter-
preting them are unclear, the LLC may be a less attractive business 
entity than more established entities with more consistent statutes 
and better settled case law.122 Rather than being the best of both 
worlds, LLCs that lack both the liquidity available to partners in a 
general partnership and the protective remedies available to inves-
tors in a corporation may lock minority LLC owners into the worst of 
both worlds.123 
 To preserve the LLC as a viable entity for small businesses, it is 
critical that legislatures, in fashioning and amending state LLC 
statutes, look beyond the estate planning use of the LLC and con-
sider how their states’ statutes will impact small businesses organ-
ized as LLCs. Most importantly, legislatures must carefully consider 
the policy objectives behind establishing the LLC in their state,124 the 
policy objectives behind establishing estate planning vehicles in their 
state, and whether these two objectives are best served by a single 
entity. I join two leading scholars in suggesting that they are not.125 
In order to serve the purpose for which it was designed, the LLC 
must be loosed from the clutches of estate planners and returned to 
the small business owners and entrepreneurs for whom it was origi-
nally conceived. 
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